Britain’s Money Supply Experiment, 1971–73 by Needham, Duncan
 1 
Britain’s money supply experiment, 1971-73 
 
 
On 8 September 1980 Bank of England Director John Fforde was summoned to 
Downing Street to explain why UK money supply growth was overshooting the 
government’s published target.  There he received a Prime Ministerial lecture on the 
importance of controlling the money supply in the battle against inflation, then 
running at 16 per cent.  Following Milton Friedman’s dictum that ‘inflation is always 
and everywhere a monetary phenomenon’, the Thatcher government had recently 
launched the Medium-Term Financial Strategy (MTFS), placing a four-year series of 
declining target ranges for broad money (£M3) growth at the heart of economic 
policy.1  Despite £M3 growth overshooting all these initial targets, inflation did fall 
below 4 per cent by the time of the 1983 election.  But this came at a heavy price.  
The 1980-81 recession was the deepest in the UK since the 1930s.2  With nominal 
interest rates peaking at 17 per cent, and sterling above $2.40, British firms struggled 
to compete in international markets.  Manufacturing output declined by 15 per cent.3  
Manufacturing investment shrank by 26 per cent.  GDP fell by nearly 5 per cent, and 
unemployment reached levels not seen since before the war.  As the head of Margaret 
Thatcher’s Policy Unit, John Hoskyns, later admitted, the government had 
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‘accidentally engineered’ a major recession with its misguided attachment to 
monetary targets and ‘done the economy a great deal of damage by mistake’.4 
Fforde was an ironic choice for a lecture on the importance of controlling £M3.  
In 1971, he had designed a previous attempt to control the money supply, Competition 
and Credit Control (‘CCC’), identified by the Bank of England’s historian, Forrest 
Capie, as ‘the biggest change in monetary policy since the Second World War’.5  Since 
the war, the authorities had sought to control the largest counterpart of the broad 
money supply (M3), bank lending to the private sector, with a raft of quantitative and 
qualitative controls.6  CCC swept these away.  Henceforward, bank lending would be 
controlled on the basis of cost i.e. through interest rates.  Loans would be granted to 
those companies and individuals that could pay the highest rate, rather than to those 
that fulfilled the authorities’ qualitative criteria within the overall quantitative 
restrictions previously imposed on the banks.  By allocating bank credit on the basis of 
cost, CCC replaced years of credit rationing ‘by control’.  Out went the restrictions on 
lending to less-favoured sectors and ceilings on bank advances that had long been a 
feature of British banking.  In came the ‘interest rate weapon’ – more active use of 
Bank Rate to control the broad money supply. 
Capie identifies three strands behind CCC: dissatisfaction with lending 
controls, a desire for a more competitive banking sector, and a renewed emphasis on 
controlling monetary growth.  He prioritises the first two, arguing: ‘it was 1976 when 
something drastic needed to be done and International Monetary Fund (IMF) financing 
was needed and the knowledge that this time the IMF would demand determined 
action on containing monetary growth before serious attention to monetary targets 
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took place’.7  This article agrees that Bank frustration with lending controls provided 
the impetus for monetary reform.  But this was a longstanding concern that had 
already generated a number of unsuccessful proposals.8  In 1970, Prime Minister Ted 
Heath’s refusal to raise interest rates in the face of rising inflation, and the prospect of 
prolonged lending controls at tighter levels, provided the final spur.  The IMF did play 
a critical role.  But this was several years earlier than Capie believes.  In 1968, the 
Fund provided the theoretical catalyst for the change that produced CCC with a 
monetary seminar involving UK officials.  It also, inadvertently, added to the practical 
reasons for change.  The credit squeeze imposed on the banks after the 1967 sterling 
devaluation tested the existing monetary framework almost to destruction.  In 1971, 
after a thoroughgoing review, the Bank believed it had identified a stable demand-for-
money function and that it could control monetary growth by manipulating interest 
rates.  This gave officials the confidence to sweep away the post-war system of 
controls and focus on the money supply instead. 
CCC was not a success.  The unpublished M3 target for 1972/73 was 20 per 
cent.  The outturn was 27 per cent.  Two years later, inflation peaked at 26.9 per cent, 
apparently vindicating Friedman’s claim that excess monetary growth leads inexorably 
to higher prices after a long and variable lag.  Seemingly unaware of this attempt to 
control the money supply by a government of which she was a member, Thatcher 
claims that her own administration ‘broke’ with post-war economic planning by 
seeking to regulate ‘those things which government could control – namely the money 
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supply and government borrowing’.9  The principal architect of the MTFS, Nigel 
Lawson, suggests that its purpose was ‘to confirm and consolidate the complete 
change of direction on which we had embarked’.10  Geoffrey Howe is more measured, 
recognising that the MTFS was ‘a logical development of the ‘letters of intent’ which 
our Labour predecessors had been obliged to send to the IMF’.11  Howe’s former 
adviser Adam Ridley has referred to the MTFS as ‘the embodiment of a rejuvenated 
IMF framework’.12  The MTFS was a less-radical departure than some of the 
memorialists claim, however unwittingly.  As Steve Ludlam had to remind an 
academic audience, published money supply targets preceded the IMF’s arrival in 
1976.13  This article shows that unpublished targets predate the 1976 IMF loan by four 
years.  It explains why the Heath government had as much difficulty hitting its 
unpublished M3 targets in the 1970s as the Thatcher government had hitting its 
published £M3 targets in the 1980s.  The target range for £M3 growth in 1980/81 was 
7-11 per cent; the outturn was 19.1 per cent.  This time, rapid monetary growth was 
not followed by rising inflation.  This dealt a sizeable blow to the monetarist theory 
underpinning the MTFS.  Treasury ministers invoked Goodhart’s Law – ‘any observed 
statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control 
purposes’.14  But Goodhart’s Law was not new in the 1980s.  It was first outlined in 
1975 in response to the authorities’ failure to hit their money supply objectives 
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between 1971 and 1973.15  Conservative policymakers, Bank officials, and Treasury 
civil servants drew different lessons from the failure of the 1971-73 money supply 
experiment.  This would have profound consequences for British economic 
performance in the early 1980s. 
 
I 
 
British monetary policy in the decade before CCC was guided by the findings of the 
1959 Radcliffe Report.  The Report rejected the idea that the Bank should seek to 
control the money supply.16  In an open economy with a sophisticated banking 
system, it was not within the Bank’s power to control the amount of money in 
circulation.  Nor, given the ‘haziness’ of the links between the money supply and final 
economic objectives, such as growth and price stability, was it clear that it should 
even try.17  In any event, with sterling fixed under the Bretton Woods exchange rate 
system, monetary policy was primarily directed towards defending the pound.  If 
there was a domestic role, it was to support fiscal policy in managing aggregate 
demand. 
It took the IMF’s intervention  in the 1960s for the UK authorities to elevate the 
role of monetary policy.  Initially, this took the form of quantitative ceilings on bank 
lending to the private sector.  The Radcliffe Report warned that ceilings were inimical 
to a competitive banking system.18  They froze aggregate lending at an arbitrary date 
and stifled innovation in the economy – banks were more likely to extend rationed 
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credit to firms with which they enjoyed longstanding relationships.  Yet, ceilings were 
in place for most of the 1960s.  This is because attempts to run the economy at full 
employment led to a succession of balance-of-payments crises as imports increased 
and exports were diverted to the domestic market.  With a chronic shortage of foreign 
currency reserves in the 1960s, current account deficits often meant recourse to the 
IMF.  Credit facilities in 1961, 1962, 1963, and August 1964 came with few 
conditions.  The shift in emphasis came after loans to the Labour government in 
November 1964 and May 1965.  This second loan was granted only after the 
Chancellor, James Callaghan, agreed to the Fund’s request that a ceiling be placed on 
bank advances to the private sector.19  As the Treasury points out, ‘the Government’s 
undertakings to the IMF as a result of the extensive use of the Fund’s facilities during 
this period compelled the authorities to modify their approach to monetary policy’.20  
As a result, ‘greater attention was paid to money supply and to domestic credit 
creation’.21 
Devaluation in November 1967 was accompanied by a request for a further $1.4 
billion IMF stand-by.  Callaghan agreed to limit the government’s borrowing 
requirement to £1 billion in 1968/69 and acknowledged ‘the expectation at present 
that bank credit expansion will be sufficiently limited to ensure that the growth of the 
money supply will be less in 1968 than the present estimate for 1967’.22  This passage 
was carefully drafted to avoid the impression that the British had been forced to 
accept a money supply objective.23  It certainly fell short of the conditions imposed 
upon developing nations, whose loans were phased according to their meeting 
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performance targets.  But with sterling forming the first line of defence for the entire 
Bretton Woods system, the British were allowed to draw down the full $1.4 billion 
immediately.24 
British officials were uneasy with this increased emphasis on monetary policy, 
and particularly with the IMF’s preferred aggregate, Domestic Credit Expansion 
(DCE), which adjusted £M3 for official financing of the balance-of-payments.  DCE 
ceilings required strict limits on the growth of bank lending to the private sector.  But 
British banking is traditionally reliant on overdrafts, which can be drawn at the 
convenience of the borrower.  This makes it difficult for banks to predict the exact 
size of their future lending.  Also, within the sophisticated British financial system, it 
is relatively easy for borrowers to find other sources of finance, thus bypassing 
lending controls applied to the major banks. 
There was also a problem with the gilt market.  With over £1 billion of new 
sales required each year to fund maturing debt, management of the gilt market was 
perceived to be a fine art.  The Bank felt it essential to maintain the marketability of 
gilt-edged by smoothing price movements.  This meant ‘leaning into the wind’.  
When the market was weak, the Government Broker would buy gilts to maintain price 
stability and investor confidence.  This was the practical consequence of a belief that 
the gilt market was driven by ‘extrapolative expectations’, that higher interest rates 
would create the expectation of yet higher interest rates.  As the Bank explained, ‘a 
downward movement, once started, may feed upon itself and threaten to go much 
further than the authorities would desire, perhaps even to the extent of risking serious 
demoralisation to the market’.25  This was the ‘cashier’s theory’ of the gilt market, 
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whereby lower prices meant lower demand, until the market fell to a level at which 
buyers could be confident of making capital gains as prices rebounded.  The Bank 
believed that published targets would exacerbate the problem.  If the market knew the 
authorities were missing an IMF target, they could be held to ransom, forced to pay a 
higher rate on the new issues required to get DCE back on track.  By contrast, Fund 
staff subscribed to the ‘economists theory’, whereby lower prices meant increased 
demand for gilts.  This, they explained, was how bond markets worked elsewhere. 
After four days of negotiations following devaluation, and flatly refusing to 
accept a DCE ceiling, the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, Sir William 
Armstrong, proposed that the two sides discuss DCE at a future date, outside the 
pressurised atmosphere of a loan negotiation.26  A seminar was arranged for October 
1968.  This came a month after the Fund responded to developing nations’ concerns 
about the easy terms applied to the UK’s 1967 loan by harmonising the conditions 
attached to loans to developing and industrial nations.  Given the persistent current 
account deficit, it was likely that Britain would require another loan in 1969.  The 
seminar would help British officials to understand the DCE conditions that would be 
applied. 
The seminar was also the catalyst for a monetary policy review within the 
Bank.27  The Times reported on 15 October 1968 that the Bank was undertaking a 
‘close study’ of the money supply.28  Bank officials had prepared papers for the 
seminar, but these were largely restatements of the Radcliffian orthodoxy.  But, as 
Fforde pointed out, given the interest generated by the seminar, and the fact that the 
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Governor intended to emphasise the importance of the money supply in his Mansion 
House speech two days later, perhaps it was time for a review.29  Thus was born the 
Money Supply Group, comprised of Kit McMahon, Leslie Dicks-Mireaux, Andrew 
Crockett, and, newly arrived from the London School of Economics, Charles 
Goodhart.  This marked the onset of a fertile period of monetary research within the 
Bank, mirroring the theoretical investigations underway in academia. 
There were few indications at the outset that the exercise would produce a 
major rethink.  In an earlier submission, Crockett had argued that the simple link 
between the money supply and nominal income assumed by the monetarists and the 
IMF did not hold for the UK with its sophisticated financial system and variety of 
close substitutes for money.  He concluded, ‘in all, the theoretical case against the 
money supply is formidable’.30  However, as the Group’s work progressed in 1969, 
the central tenets of Radcliffe collapsed, one by one. 
First to go was the Keynesian assumption that money was at one end of a 
liquidity spectrum of financial assets.  Keynesians believed that monetary 
disturbances ‘rippled through’ financial assets before impacting the real economy.  
There should, therefore, be a high interest elasticity of demand-for-money.  Small 
changes in interest rates should have a large effect on the money stock.  But as 
Crockett reviewed the recent investigations into the British data, he found a low 
interest elasticity of demand-for-money in the UK.31  Individuals were equally likely 
to respond to a change in their preferred (real) money balances by changing their 
purchases of goods and services, as their holdings of financial assets. Goodhart 
reported that ‘the general conclusion from these results must be that, certainly in the 
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short run of under two years, the direct link between the quantity of money and 
interest rates on financial assets is much less strong than many Keynesians 
expected’.32  This might just mean that ‘Keynesian’ demand-for-money equations had 
been mis-specified.  The transmission mechanism could still be along a liquidity 
spectrum; it may just be that financial assets were less sensitive to short-term interest 
rates than had been believed.  In any event, if the relationship between the money 
supply and incomes was weak i.e. if the velocity of circulation was unstable, and 
causality ran from incomes to money, there still seemed little point in trying to control 
the money supply. 
The Radcliffe Committee had assumed that interest rate changes were offset by 
changes in the velocity of circulation, leaving incomes largely unaffected.  In April 
1969, Crockett showed instead that interest rates were a minor factor in determining 
velocity which was ‘fairly stable’ in the long term.33  If the velocity of circulation was 
stable, then so was its analogue, the demand-for-money.  Indeed the results suggested 
that the Bank could predict, with a high degree of confidence, the demand-for-money 
to within three percentage points.  With the caveat that the relationship might break 
down if the authorities stopped leaning into the wind, Crockett stated that ‘the 
conclusions of this piece of work are generally consistent with the quantity theory 
point of view as expounded by Friedman’.34 
In July 1969, the Group’s draft report showed members still holding to the 
Keynesian belief that the demand-for-money was primarily driven by incomes and not 
the other way round, as the monetarists insisted.35  But by October, Crockett had 
‘definite evidence that movements in the money supply tend to lead changes in 
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incomes’.36  Applying ‘spectral analysis’, a technique developed in the physical 
sciences to analyse the relationships between long time series, he had isolated a lead 
of 2–3 months between changes in the money supply and incomes.  The relationship 
was weak, indicating that the results should be ‘treated with some caution’.37  
Nonetheless, when the Group published its final report, The Importance of Money, a 
year later, this became: ‘in the United Kingdom movements in the money stock have 
preceded movements in money incomes’ and ‘in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, a consistent lead is a prima facie indication of causation’.38  This was a 
major development.  But there was one more hurdle to cross.  As long as the Bank 
believed it had to stabilize the gilt market, tight control of the money supply through 
more frequent changes in interest rates was ruled out.  It would take another year for 
the Bank to modify its approach to the operation of the gilt market. 
 The delay was caused by the imposition of a DCE ceiling as a condition for 
the anticipated IMF loan in 1969.  The 1965 and 1966 drawings from the Fund were 
falling due and, with the current account taking an inexorably long time to recover, 
the Bank had insufficient dollar reserves to repay.  There was little alternative to 
another stand-by arrangement.  Given the harmonisation of stand-by criteria the 
previous September, and the monetary seminar in October, there was no doubt that 
further assistance would require a DCE ceiling.  Nonetheless, when the negotiations 
began in earnest in May, the British made their objections plain.  Labour 
backbenchers had reacted bitterly to even the weak conditionality imposed in 
November 1967.  They would certainly take issue with performance targets in 1969.  
The Chancellor, Roy Jenkins, knew that if he overshot a published ceiling, the 
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markets would demand higher interest rates, confident that the Bank would have to 
accept whatever terms were offered to guarantee the gilt sales necessary to continue 
drawing from the IMF.  But if he undershot the ceiling, his backbenchers would 
demand reflation, as would the more expansionary-minded Conservatives.  Given the 
margin for error in the forecasts, there was a real danger of missing the ceiling on 
either side. 
Confronted with these political and technical difficulties, the new Permanent 
Secretary, Sir Douglas Allen, formulated a compromise.  The British would agree to a 
published £400 million DCE ceiling for 1968/69, comprised of an unpublished £250 
million target, derived from the Treasury forecasts, and a £150 million margin for 
error with quarterly performance targets laid out in a secret memorandum of 
understanding.39  And, instead of a breach of the ceiling triggering a visit from the 
Fund, Jenkins agreed to three further surveillance missions.  These would take place 
regardless of the DCE outcome.  As the Economist pointed out, ‘the most important 
feature of Mr Jenkins’s letter of intent to the International Monetary Fund is the 
thinness of the fig leaf that has been stretched over the trigger clause’.40  Nonetheless, 
Bank, Treasury, and IMF officials were in no doubt that the DCE numbers were 
performance criteria and that the number to ‘hit’ was the £250 million target rather 
than the £400 million ceiling.  When the July 1969 forecasts showed annualised DCE 
of £448 million, the Treasury immediately drew up contingencies to get back below 
the £250 million target.41 
Technically, DCE does not qualify as a money supply target, since it 
incorporates the balance-of-payments.  However, as the Treasury explained, ‘a money 
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supply objective is implied by the official commitment to a DCE ceiling and to a 
balance-of-payments target’.42  A DCE target of £250 million in 1969 implied an M3 
growth objective of £550 million (3.7 per cent), assuming the desired £300 million 
current account surplus was achieved.43  In the event, the improvement in the current 
account during the summer of 1969 meant the government had little difficulty in 
meeting the DCE ceiling.  However, as Goodhart points out, the fact that the external 
balance improved during a period of monetary targeting contributed to ‘a tendency to 
turn towards other monetary indicators as a guide to the appropriate policy for 
achieving domestic internal objectives’.44  The authorities may have been sceptical, 
but monetary aggregates were now more respectable than at any time since the 
Radcliffe Report. 
If the IMF provided the theoretical catalyst for CCC, it also helped to provide 
the practical catalyst. As part of the austerity measures announced in November 1967, 
the banks were told to freeze aggregate lending to the private sector.  A year later, 
with the current account still in deficit and another IMF mission due, the ceiling was 
lowered to 98 per cent of its immediate pre-devaluation level.45  With inflation 
running at nearly 5 per cent, this was a significant tightening of policy and caused 
friction with the clearing banks.  By the autumn of 1969, the banks had been in breach 
of their ceilings for nearly a year.  This led to the formation of the Bank-Treasury 
Working Group on Control of Bank Credit which, after re-forming as the Monetary 
Policy Group (MPG), was charged with formulating an alternative to ceilings in time 
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for the 1970 Budget.  Given the short timescale, the MPG had to limit itself to 
recalibrating existing instruments.   This meant that the Bank could not yet feed in the 
results of the work done by the Money Supply Group. 
The MPG submitted its interim report to the Chancellor in March 1970.46  
Having discounted the alternatives, members settled on abolishing ceiling controls in 
favour of ‘guidance’ on lending in the year ahead, coupled with more active calls for 
special deposits to control bank liquidity.  (Special deposits required the banks to post 
a percentage of their gross advances at the Bank during periods of credit restraint).  
Accordingly, in his April Budget, Jenkins removed the 98 per cent ceiling, while 
requesting that the clearers restrict their lending to ‘a gradual and moderate increase 
over the coming year: of the order of, say, 5 per cent’.47  He also announced a new 
DCE ceiling of £900 million.  The surveillance period for the 1969 IMF loan had 
expired, so this was not forced upon him.  But to the IMF’s pleasant surprise ‘the 
Chancellor appear[ed] to have fallen in love with DCE’.48  To the chagrin of the Bank, 
and many in the Treasury, Jenkins said he had found DCE useful in imposing 
discipline on economic policy.49  Within the Treasury, this was ‘widely glossed as 
implying a 5 per cent money supply target’.50  
After the Budget, the prospect of an imminent General Election meant the 
MPG had to put concrete policy considerations aside.  The Permanent Secretary set it 
the more abstruse task of investigating the latest developments in monetary theory.  
The Bank could now feed in the conclusions of its Money Supply Group.  At the first 
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MPG meeting after the Budget, members considered the Group’s report, The 
Importance of Money.  The paper was given a sympathetic hearing, with the Treasury 
briefing noting that ‘a stable demand [for money] function seems well established’.51  
There was also ‘some feeling that as a medium-term aim it might be sensible to 
establish a money supply objective rather than an interest rate objective’.52  But as 
long as the Bank believed that the gilt market was driven by extrapolative 
expectations, and was therefore inherently unstable, then more frequent changes in 
interest rates continued to be ruled out.  The Government Broker could not lean into 
the wind and control the money supply at the same time.  The Importance of Money 
did not challenge this assumption, suggesting that ‘aggressive actions by the 
authorities in markets subject to volatile reactions could cause exaggerated and 
excessive fluctuations in financial conditions’.53  Nonetheless, Sir Douglas Allen 
concluded that, ‘the present policy regarding DCE, and the Chancellor’s public 
announcement of the annual rate of domestic credit expansion expected, had 
something of the flavour of a money supply objective’.54  The authorities had to 
devise some way of ensuring that the gilt market did not frustrate their increasing 
emphasis on the money supply. 
The key work was done over the summer of 1970.  In early September, 
Michael Hamburger, on secondment to the Bank from the New York Federal Reserve, 
reported that approximately 50 per cent of the price volatility of undated gilts could 
be explained by Eurodollar rates, anticipated inflation, and the forward differential 
between sterling and US dollar rates.  If this were true, then expectations extrapolated 
from recent changes in Bank Rate were less important than had long been believed.  
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Hamburger concluded, ‘it is difficult to find any evidence whatever that the increased 
stress placed on controlling monetary aggregates has led to a deterioration in the 
behaviour of the gilt-edged market’.55  As Fforde explained, ‘if greater flexibility of 
short-term interest rates were to result in a rise in rates to a level which could clearly 
be regarded as a peak unlikely to be sustained, expectations could be set up which 
could lead to a demand for longer-date securities’.56  This reconciliation between the 
‘economists theory’ and the ‘cashier’s theory’ would become known as the ‘Duke of 
York theory’.   The Bank would march gilt investors up to the top of the hill by 
raising interest rates.  It would then march them down again with successive cuts.  
This would hopefully allow the authorities to wield the interest rate weapon without 
imperilling their ability to fund the national debt. 
The Bank was already armed with its demand-for-money equations, published 
in the June 1970 Quarterly Bulletin.  It could now unleash the ‘interest rate weapon’.  
As Goodhart points out: ‘The demand-for-money functions appeared to promise that 
credit and money could be controlled by price (interest rates), so that ceilings could be 
abandoned.  Although some older and more experienced officials doubted all the 
econometrics (quite rightly as it happened), they wished to embrace this latter 
message’.57  One of those older and more experienced officials was Fforde who, a 
year earlier, had referred to monetarism as ‘wishful primitivism, born of exasperation 
with certain intractable economic problems of modern society’.58  Yet, in October 
1970, he reacted to what he termed ‘the adoption of fairly precise targets for certain 
monetary aggregates as an object of policy’ by feeding some of monetarism’s key 
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principles into his latest proposal for monetary reform.59  Instead of prolonging ceiling 
controls, he proposed to end credit rationing ‘by control’ in favour of rationing ‘by 
cost’.  Capie finds it ‘surprising’ that Fforde should have advocated ‘more frequent 
and larger variations in short-term interest rates’ in October 1970.60  It was not at all 
surprising.  The Bank’s work on the gilt market suggested that the final obstacle to 
managing the money supply had been overcome.   
  
II 
 
Fforde believed that the arrival of a Conservative government in 1970, committed to 
injecting more competition into the economy, provided an opportunity for monetary 
reform.  Before the election, the Conservatives had announced that ‘competition is the 
key principle which distinguishes the Conservative from the Socialist outlook on 
economic policy’.61  In March 1970, Sir Keith Joseph had placed increased clearing 
bank competition on a list of measures designed to improve economic performance.62  
Fforde recognised that the likelihood of permanently dismantling ceiling controls 
would be enhanced by stressing the competitive aspects of monetary reform.  There 
would certainly be no sympathy for anything that smacked of ‘monetarism’ amongst 
the Conservative leadership.  As Joseph’s biographers point out, Heath was ‘a 
Keynesian by instinct and by intellectual conviction’ who upon meeting Friedman 
found him to be ‘wholly unconvincing’.63  Fforde tailored his approach accordingly. 
                                                 
59
 Bank of England, ‘Restraint of bank and finance house lending’, 14 October 1970, TNA, 
T326/1258. 
60
 Capie, Bank of England, p. 486. 
61
 
‘’Lewis to Sewill’, 11 April 1969, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive 
(‘CPA’), CRD 3/7/4/1. 
62
 ‘Joseph to Maudling’, 18 March 1970, CPA, CRD 3/7/4/1.  
63
 A. Denham and M. Garnett, Keith Joseph (Chesham, 2001), p. 245. 
 18 
Heath’s first Chancellor, Iain Macleod, suffered a fatal heart attack within a 
month of the 1970 election.  The Prime Minister imposed his authority over the 
Treasury by appointing the economically inexperienced Anthony Barber.  Shortly 
before his first Autumn statement, Barber asked his officials for ‘a basic paper’ 
explaining DCE and the money supply, ‘subject[s] which he had not yet had time to 
study carefully’.64  With the money supply growing by an annualised 16 per cent, the 
Chancellor was advised to raise Bank Rate forthwith: 
 
Tightening monetary policy this autumn will require an increase in interest 
rates…If the rates of growth of the money supply and DCE are to be slowed 
down by monetary means the authorities must either secure a lower rate of 
expansion of bank lending than has prevailed recently, or they must sell more 
gilt-edged stock to the non-bank public.  Or they must do both.
65
  
 
On 20 October, ‘feeling uneasy about the expansion of the money supply’, the 
Governor pressed for an immediate two-percentage point rise in Bank Rate (to 9 per 
cent).66  Barber replied that ‘he was keenly aware of the criticism of the expansion of 
the money supply in the press and elsewhere’ but 8 per cent would be perceived as a 
‘crisis rate’, 9 per cent would be ‘an entirely new policy’.67  The Governor pressed 
him again: 
 
Inflation was the main problem, and the control of the money supply must 
contribute to the solution of that problem.  Recently the control of the money 
supply had not been adequate.  He could certainly not guarantee that an 
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increase in Bank Rate would solve the problem of inflation, but it should make 
things easier.
68
 
 
Two days later Barber asked the Prime Minister for a one percentage point rise.  He 
was rebuffed: 
 
The Prime Minister thought that an increase in Bank Rate at this point in time 
would seriously diminish the good effect of the Chancellor’s statement as well 
as being inconsistent with everything which he and Mr Macleod had said in 
Opposition.  An increase would simply not be understood, at a time when 
there was no external outflow, and would give rise to the suspicion that the 
external position was not as satisfactory as it seemed.
69
 
 
Heath’s refusal to raise Bank Rate in the face of rising inflation explains the urgency 
the Bank attached to overhauling the monetary system in late 1970.  Inflation, which 
had averaged just over 5 per cent since devaluation, was at nearly 8 per cent.  More 
ominously, earnings had risen 14 per cent over the year, and were forecast to rise by 
another 15.5 per cent over the next.70   This threatened to reverse the competitive 
advantage British exports had gained from devaluation, and three years of austerity. 
 With incomes policies precluded at this stage, the orthodox reaction to what 
was perceived to be a wage-push inflation was tighter fiscal policy.  But major tax 
changes were ruled out until the spring Budget and would, in any case, represent a 
reversal of the government’s growth strategy.  With higher Bank Rate also ruled out 
by the Prime Minister, tighter monetary policy would mean prolonging ceiling 
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controls, perhaps at an even tighter level.  Fforde ‘foresaw grave difficulties in 
attempting to force banks – in effect by directive – to bankrupt some of their 
customers’ if ceilings were lowered and set to work, sending what he himself called ‘a 
curious and rather emotional note’ to the Governor on Christmas Eve 1970.71  The 
note had a galvanising effect inside the Bank.  Within a month, the draft outline of 
CCC had been presented to the Chancellor. 
The Bank’s proposal was predicated on shifting the emphasis from bank lending 
to the broader money supply.  This may not be obvious from a simple reading of the 
document, but after several years of discussion there was near-universal agreement 
amongst Bank and Treasury officials that control should be directed towards the 
money supply.  Indeed, Treasury adviser Michael Posner’s first reaction to the 
proposal was to criticise the lack of a precise money supply target: ‘the complete 
absence of numbers is a major weakness of the paper.  To buy the scheme for an extra 
1 or 2% in the supply of money would be most attractive: but if we were to fear 5% 
extra for two or three years, it would not seem worthwhile.72  Sir Douglas Allen 
agreed, declaring that ‘it should be assumed that it was still desired to have a 
numerical target for the monetary aggregates’.73  He expanded two weeks later: 
 
It was likely that the borrowing requirement in the coming financial year 
would be very large and this raised the question whether the Chancellor 
should announce any target for DCE and the money supply.  Any figure he 
might give would be in marked contrast for those in the most recent years.  On 
the other hand, the IMF was keen on targets for money supply and DCE and 
we might, if we had to borrow from them again in 1972, have to produce one.  
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There could therefore be advantage in producing one of our own accord this 
year.
74
 
 
The Bank’s demand-for-money equations indicated that M3 would have to 
increase by 11-12 per cent in 1971/72 to accommodate the government’s GDP growth 
objectives.75  Officials considered whether to publish a monetary target.  DCE ceilings 
continued to be ruled out on technical grounds.  However: 
 
To publish a percentage target figure for the money supply would raise less 
problems (sic).  But any percentage figure for the year, such as 11% or 12%, 
would be linked with the Chancellor’s statement at the Finance Houses 
Association that his policy was to keep the growth of the money supply rather 
below the going rate of inflation, and the conclusion would be drawn that the 
Government were expecting a very rapid rate of inflation.  Against this 
background it was felt that the Chancellor’s best course would be to give no 
figure for the money supply either.
76
 
 
There was a widespread view that the most useful weapon against what was generally 
agreed to be cost-push inflation was wage restraint or ‘de-escalation’.  As Second 
Permanent Secretary Sir Alan Neale pointed out, ‘the de-escalation must come first 
and we do not believe that it can be brought about by restricting the money supply’.77  
Instead, Barber announced in his 1971 Budget that ‘there would be dangers for 
liquidity and employment if we sought immediately to reduce the growth of money 
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supply to much below 3 per cent per quarter’.78 The Daily Telegraph simply 
multiplied this quarterly ‘guideline’ by four and assumed that the government was 
now working with an annual 12 per cent M3 target.79  This caused consternation 
amongst officials trying to get away from hooking themselves on published numbers.  
In his next public speech, Barber stressed that: 
 
I deliberately set very short-term guidelines for the increase in bank lending 
and in money supply – 2.5 per cent and 3 per cent per quarter respectively.  It 
would be quite wrong to multiply these figures by four, as some commentators 
have done, and apply them to the next twelve months.
80 
 
This sounded hollow when the Bank published the consultative document for CCC a 
month later.  As the Governor revealed, ‘we have increasingly shifted our emphasis 
towards the broader monetary aggregates  to use the inelegant but apparently 
unavoidable term: the money supply’.81 
The Bank also announced an immediate reduction in the liquidity provided by 
the Government Broker.  As the Chief Cashier explained: 
 
Some time before the reappraisal of monetary policy which led up to 
Competition and credit control had been completed, the conclusion had been 
reached that the Bank’s operations in the gilt-edged market should pay more 
regard to their quantitative effects on the monetary aggregates and less regard 
to the behaviour of interest rates.
82
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This press seized upon the Government Broker’s partial withdrawal.  The Guardian 
stated, ‘we are back to money supply, pure and simple…The Bank will not support 
the market…If this causes prices to collapse and thus a sharp rise in interest rates, so 
be it.  That is what a money supply policy is all about’.83  The Daily Telegraph 
questioned ‘the Bank’s timing of its final conversion to the theories of the money 
supply school when those theories are being called more and more into question’.84  
The Times was much happier:  
 
The new gilt-edged policy is the logical culmination of a process which began 
in the autumn of 1968, when the International Monetary Fund and 
independent critics began to place increasing emphasis on the money supply 
as a weapon of economic policy rather than on the level of interest rates, 
which had previously been the touchstone of the Bank of England’s operations 
in the gilt-edged market. 
85
 
 
 
But what of the IMF, which had sparked off the monetary policy review with its 
October 1968 seminar?  The consultative document for CCC was released during the 
1971 annual consultation.  British officials explained that monetary policy now meant 
‘an increase in money supply of roughly 3 per cent in the first one or two quarters of 
the fiscal year’ and that the new system was ‘well suited to operate towards money 
supply targets’.86  The Fund’s subsequent report was clear: ‘the principal aim of the 
                                                 
83
 ‘Has the Bank really eaten its words?’ Guardian, 17 May 1971. 
84
 ‘Competitive waves make gilts queasy’, Daily Telegraph, 18 May 1971. 
85
 ‘Simpler plan to control the money supply’, Times, 15 May 1971. 
86
 ‘Monetary policy’, 20 May 1971, BOE, 3A8/14. 
 24 
new arrangements is to operate toward money supply targets’.87  But Fund staff, still 
wedded to DCE, were sceptical: ‘monetary policy should continue to be directed in 
such a way as to safeguard the foreign position’.88  They were also concerned that the 
implied 12 per cent M3 growth target would do little to moderate wage rises, which 
they agreed were at the root of rising inflation.  The Fund may have provided the 
catalyst for the review that ultimately produced CCC, but in the intervening years the 
work of, first the Bank’s Money Supply Group, and then the joint Bank-Treasury 
MPG had taken British monetary policy down a different path. 
 
III 
 
CCC became fully operational in September 1971.  Credit rationing by cost replaced 
rationing by control.  The 2.5 per cent quarterly guideline for bank lending announced 
in the March budget was suspended and the banking cartels were dissolved.  What 
followed was one of the most intense periods of monetary chaos in recent British 
history.  By the time the policy was de facto abandoned in December 1973, M3 had 
grown by 72 per cent.  Britain’s highest-ever inflation, and the worst banking crisis 
since 1914, followed hard on the heels of CCC.  Failure to control the money supply 
in 1972-73 would shape the Bank’s attitude to monetary policy for years to come. 
 After launching CCC the next practical consideration was the construction of 
the autumn 1971 financial forecasts.  Previously, the Treasury had incorporated a set 
of interest rate assumptions into both the financial forecasts and the National Income 
Forecasts.  The head of the Treasury’s Monetary Policy Division, Frank Cassell, 
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explained the implications of the increased emphasis on the money supply to the 
Chancellor: 
 
The financial forecasts were constructed so as to explore the implications of 
following a particular growth target for money supply; and it has to be decided 
in the light of the forecasts as a whole whether the chosen monetary policy 
assumption is one that it would be appropriate for us to adopt as an 
objective.
89
 
 
At this stage, sterling was still within the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange 
rates.  This leads Susan Howson to conclude that monetary targets ‘could not be 
seriously adopted until the government had given up the commitment to the fixed 
exchange rate’ in June 1972.90  However, after December 1971, sterling was permitted 
to fluctuate within a wider 4.5 per cent band against the dollar.  This provided a larger 
‘shock absorber’ for the money supply, since capital flows could increasingly be 
accommodated by the exchange rate.91  Also, as both J.H.B. Tew and Peter Browning 
point out, the return to current account surplus was an important factor in the timing of 
CCC.92  With less strain on the currency reserves, monetary policy could increasingly 
be directed towards the domestic economy.93  In 1971, Treasury economists were 
keenly aware of the constraints placed upon monetary policy by the exchange rate: 
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if we want to hold the exchange rate around a certain level and keep the 
inflow of funds from abroad within certain limits, we have already in effect 
determined monetary policy.  We cannot have targets for the exchange rate, 
the reserve inflow and the money supply.  We can choose any two of these; 
and the third then falls out as the residual.
94
 
 
The Bank had sterilised a large capital inflow in 1970/71 by selling gilts to the non-
banking private sector, holding M3 growth to 13 per cent.  In late 1971, officials were 
anticipating further external surpluses which they hoped to continue sterilising with 
gilt sales.  With a fixed exchange rate and a money supply growth objective, this 
meant that the reserve inflow had to fall out of the forecast as the residual.  They just 
had to decide what the M3 objective would be.  Since the 1971 Budget represented 
the last official ministerial pronouncement on monetary policy, the Treasury chose to 
‘take at face value the government’s pronouncements’ and fall back on the 3 per cent 
quarterly guideline, derived from the demand-for-money equations, and announced by 
Barber in March.95 
The November 1971 forecast started with a 12 per cent per annum guideline for 
M3, and finished with gilt sales to the public as the balancing item.  As Cassell 
explained: 
 
the main residual in constructing this financial forecast is gilt-edged sales to 
non-bank investors.  We have allowed bank lending to the private sector to be 
effectively demand-determined, and hence, given the public sector borrowing 
requirement and the external flow, the figures inserted for gilt edged (or more 
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widely, sales of public sector debt as a whole) are simply those that would be 
required to keep money supply to its assumed growth rate.
96
 
 
Treasury officials were uneasy at the emphasis being placed on the Bank’s 
demand-for-money equations.  This stemmed largely from the Bank’s finding that the 
income elasticity of demand-for-money for individuals was 2.1, i.e. for every £1 
increase in their income, individuals would demand an extra £2.10 in cash or near 
substitutes.  Treasury economists felt this was ‘improbably high’; they doubted 
whether money could be such a ‘luxury good’. 97  Consequently, they were not yet 
able to recommend a formal money supply target.  Nonetheless, the Bank’s interest 
elasticity numbers were used to construct the 1972 Budget forecasts and were 
published in the March 1972 Quarterly Bulletin.  The accompanying article stated that 
the equations ‘provide a sufficiently accurate statistical explanation of past 
movements in the stock of money to be a useful guide for monetary policy’.98  This 
rested on the assumption that ‘past relationships between income and the demand-for-
money embodied in the Bank’s equations are applicable to the future’.99  But the 
Heath government was about to embark on an economic experiment that would take 
the PSBR and nominal income growth ‘outside the range of previous experience’.100  
The dash for growth would force officials to overcome their scruples about money 
supply targets. 
 While the Treasury was rebasing its financial forecasts onto a money supply 
objective, the Prime Minister was worrying about how to generate faster economic 
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growth.  Barber had announced a 4 – 4.5 per cent real GDP growth target in July.101  
By the autumn, the economy was growing at half that rate.  More ominously, 
registered unemployment was just below the politically-sensitive one million mark.  
At a meeting of cabinet ministers, senior civil servants, and businessmen in December 
1971, Heath warmed to Sir William Armstrong’s suggestion that ‘we should think 
big, and try to build up our industry onto a Japanese scale.  This would mean more 
public spending.  We should ask companies what they needed in the way of financial 
and other help, and give it to them’.102  As the financier Jim Slater pointed out at the 
meeting, what companies wanted was lower interest rates.103  Heath asked the 
Treasury how they might engineer a drop in long-term rates.  He was advised that ‘a 
reduction in interest rates by, say, 1%, might … raise the total growth in money 
supply in the year to around 20%.  This compares with the last figure given by the 
Chancellor, namely 3% a quarter, in the Budget’.104  It was also pointed out that long-
term rates were off their recent highs.  Heath agreed that ‘we should not take any 
drastic steps to accelerate the present downward trend in long-term rates’.105  But his 
instincts were clearly still against higher interest rates.  
 With the economy stagnating during the three-day week in early 1972, the 
Treasury estimated that there was room to grow real GDP by 5 per cent in the year 
ahead.106  Officials had recently increased their estimate of the economy’s annual 
growth potential by half a percentage point to 3.5 per cent, citing supply-side 
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improvements.107  The British economy appeared to be operating with a large output 
gap.  This is important to understanding why Heath and Barber believed they could 
grow the economy at more than twice its post-war average.  In his 1972 Budget, the 
Chancellor boosted demand by an estimated 2 per cent of GDP.  He also reversed the 
1969 decision to disallow interest on personal loans against income tax.108  Officials 
warned that ‘the move would result in a big increase in lending by the banks for 
private consumer spending’.109  Nonetheless tax relief for interest was a manifesto 
pledge.  It was included in the 1972 Budget. 
This could hardly have come at a worse time for monetary policy.  Six months 
after predicating monetary control on the interest rate weapon, that weapon was 
blunted by making interest payments deductible against tax.  For a basic rate taxpayer, 
the cost of servicing a loan was immediately reduced by 30 per cent.  For the highest 
rate taxpayers, it was reduced by 90 per cent.  This measure alone meant it would take 
much higher interest rates to control bank lending to the private sector and, therefore, 
M3.  It also meant that, far from generating the investment boom the Prime Minister 
was looking for, the dash for growth would produce an asset and property boom that 
would crash in 1973 with terminal consequences for a number of British banks. 
 In his Budget speech, Barber also uttered what The Times called ‘the most 
important words to be spoken by any Chancellor for a decade’: ‘the lesson of the 
international balance of payments upsets of the last few years is that it is neither 
necessary nor desirable to distort domestic economies to an unacceptable extent in 
order to retain unrealistic exchange rates, whether they are too high or too low’.110  
The Conservatives were not going to let the pound, re-fixed at $2.60 just three months 
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earlier, stand in the way of their growth objectives.111  The stage was set for the ‘last 
Keynesian fling’.112 
 The 1972 Budget created an immediate monetary policy problem.  The 
forecast Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) for 1972/73 was £3.35 billion 
(5 per cent of GDP).113  The Bank estimated that long-term interest rates would have 
to rise by 1.5 percentage points to induce investors to take up the gilts necessary to 
fund the deficit, taking them through the politically sensitive 10 per cent level.114  The 
alternative was to finance the PSBR by selling more Treasury Bills to the banks.  But 
Treasury Bills were a reserve asset under CCC, and this would increase the banks’ 
lending capacity, and therefore the money supply.  Heath’s opposition to higher long-
term rates could mean an estimated £700 million of additional Treasury Bill issuance 
in 1972/73.  This could take M3 growth to an unprecedented 20 per cent.115  Nervous 
officials tried to build in some future interest rate flexibility by turning the money 
supply forecast into a target: 
 
we believe that the right course is to adopt a quantitative (but unpublished) 
target for money supply, and not to feel that we must at all costs hold to a 
certain level of interest rates … At the moment, given the present prospects for 
prices and the intention for output set out in the Budget, the appropriate target 
for money supply would be a rise of 20% in 1972/73.
116
 
 
The Permanent Secretary wrote to the Chancellor on the day of the 1972 Budget to 
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‘recommend the adoption of a quantitative (but unpublished) target for money supply, 
which in the light of present forecasts and objectives we would put as a rise of 20 per 
cent in 1972/73’.117  Barber agreed: 
Numerical targets for money supply were not given in the Budget Speech.  
But the Chancellor has accepted our advice that for the present policy should 
be directed towards a target rate of growth of money supply of about 20% in 
the financial year 1972/73  20% being the growth which the Bank of 
England’s demand-for-money equations suggest will be required, given the 
outlook for real output and prices, if there is to be no significant rise in interest 
rates from their present levels.
118
 
 
Capie quotes this submission but still maintains that there were no numerical targets 
for the money supply in 1972.119  He calls it ‘a truly extraordinary objective’.120  It is 
only extraordinary if one believes that the Bank and Treasury were trying to target 
interest rates and the money supply at the same time.  They were not.  As we have 
seen, the reason for Fforde’s urgency in seeking to overhaul the monetary system in 
December 1970 was Heath’s refusal to raise interest rates in the face of rising 
inflation.  The 20 per cent M3 target agreed by Barber in March 1972 was entirely 
consistent with this.  Far from capping interest rates, officials were trying to ensure 
the interest rate flexibility that CCC required.  Without higher interest rates, the Bank 
did not believe it could rein in bank lending to the private sector, or sell sufficient 
gilts to mop up the additional liquidity created by the dash for growth.  The Bank 
                                                 
117
 ‘Allen to Barber’, 21 March 1972, TNA, T326/1562. 
118
 Cassell, ‘Monetary policy’, 26 April 1972, TNA, T326/1562. 
119
 The Governor discussed the 20 per cent target with the Prime Minister at lunch on 5 May 
1972, ‘Downey to Cassell’, 5 May 1972, TNA, T326/1563; Capie, Bank of England, p. 646. 
120
 Capie, Bank of England, p. 646. 
 32 
estimated that M3 would have to rise by 20 per cent in 1972/73 to accommodate the 
fiscal stimulus announced in the Budget.  Less than 20 per cent and the government 
might not achieve its 5 per cent real GDP growth target.  More than 20 per cent and 
there might be an additional, unwanted, monetary stimulus.  This would run the risk 
of overheating the economy. 
 
IV 
 
Having secured the Chancellor’s agreement to an unpublished money supply target, 
the Treasury convened a series of meetings to coincide with the release of the 
monthly money supply figures.  The first took place in May 1972.  By then the Bank 
hoped the distortions associated with the transition away from ceiling controls would 
have worked their way through the system.121  By May, it was clear that monetary 
policy was off-track.  The Budget had fuelled inflationary expectations and the gilt-
market was thoroughly demoralised.  The Government Broker had been a net buyer of 
gilts and, as Cassell explained, M3 was ‘rising considerably faster than the 20% rate 
we took as our objective’.122  The policy implications were clear: ‘a rise in interest 
rates would follow naturally from holding to the objective of a 20% growth for money 
supply’.123  Fforde agreed, opening the meeting by noting that ‘money supply 
continued to rise at an annual rate of at least 20%, with bank lending to the private 
sector the dominant expansionary factor’.124  With a consensus in favour of tighter 
monetary policy, Barber was advised that: 
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In previous submissions to the Chancellor it has been emphasised that it may 
be necessary for interest rates to rise if we are to hold the growth of money 
supply to 20% whether through restraint on the demand for credit or through 
sales of public sector debt outside the banking system…If the rate of 
expansion were to be allowed to rise to well over 20%, there would be a 
serious danger that the monetary boost to demand, combined with the effects 
of the fiscal stimulus given in the Budget, would make it very difficult to keep 
the economy under control in 1973.
125
 
 
The Chancellor agreed; the Prime Minister did not.  Despite acknowledging that M3 
was growing faster than the 20 per cent ‘envisaged at the time of the Budget’, Heath 
still refused to raise Bank Rate.126  He was concerned that a hike would be construed as 
a return to the ‘stop-go’ policies of the 1960s.127  On 16 June, the Governor and the 
Permanent Secretary pressed the Prime Minister, once again, for a one-percentage 
point rise in Bank Rate to be announced five days later, alongside the latest money 
supply figures.  Heath prevaricated, arguing that ‘an increase in bank rate at this point 
in time would seem to public opinion to be a contradiction of the Government’s 
policies for encouraging a high rate of economic growth’.128  He finally agreed to raise 
rates on 22 June against the backdrop of the sterling crisis that saw the pound ejected 
from the European currency ‘snake’:129 
 
The Chancellor saw the Prime Minister and, not without some argumentation, 
convinced him that Bank Rate should be raised to 6 per cent on the following 
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day.  The primary purpose was to curb the rate of increase in the money 
supply and so damp down inflationary pressures.  The fact that the higher rate 
would help to remedy the weakness of sterling was a secondary consideration 
 almost an afterthought.130 
 
As the Bank explained in the September 1972 Quarterly Bulletin: ‘The move was 
seen as consistent with the official monetary policy objective of restraining the 
growth in the money stock – which was currently very rapid – to a rate which was 
adequate, but not excessive, to finance the 5% annual rate of expansion in real output 
expected at the time of the Budget’.131 
Theory suggests that floating the pound should have marked a fundamental 
change in the operation of monetary policy. In truth, little changed.  Barber had 
effectively pre-announced the float in his March Budget, the Treasury had drawn up 
contingencies, and the Governor was not obliged to interrupt his summer holiday.132  
In any event, the Bank would continue to intervene in the currency markets for 
another five years.  This was not a ‘clean’ float.  Nonetheless, six months after the 
realignment of currencies in December 1971, and just two months after the birth of 
the currency snake, international cooperation was not yet dead.  In June 1972, the 
leading central banks spent $2.6 billion defending the pound.  As sterling sank, the 
Bank had to compensate its international partners for their losses.  Having announced 
with much fanfare that the previous Labour government’s debts to the IMF had been 
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settled in April 1972, the Conservatives now drew $630 million from the Fund to 
repay the central banks.133 
Despite the outflow of capital, early indications showed record monthly M3 
growth of 3.5 per cent in June 1972.  Barber was advised that with the pound now 
floating, ‘the importance of the external confidence factor in the new situation adds 
weight to the already strong domestic arguments for holding down the expansion of 
money supply during 1972/73 to a maximum of 20%’.134  Once again, political 
considerations prevailed. The government’s strategy of tackling wage inflation by 
pressing down on successive public sector pay settlements was in disarray after the 
miners were awarded a 30 per cent pay rise.  Having ruled out a statutory incomes 
policy in its 1970 manifesto, the government spent much of 1972 engaged in 
‘tripartite’ talks with the TUC and CBI.   Negotiations were at a delicate stage, with a 
national strike planned for 26 July.  Higher debt servicing and mortgage charges 
would make agreement on prices and incomes controls harder.  As the President of the 
CBI pointed out, ‘the recently announced further increase in bank base rates to 7% will 
damage the prospects of agreement on a package to contain inflation’.135  The CBI had 
clearly not been bitten by the monetarist bug. 
Nor had the Prime Minister.  On 31 July, Heath ruled out higher interest rates 
on ‘confidence’ grounds while expressing ‘the hope that the fullest attention was being 
given to the money supply problem and to action that might help it, without involving 
an increase in Bank Rate’.136  Heath’s refusal to raise Bank Rate was not the only 
monetary problem experienced in the summer of 1972.  By July, the Bank was 
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reporting ‘considerable problems with the equation used to predict the demand-for-
money by persons’.137  The re-worked equations indicated that M3 growth, 7.75 per 
cent in the three months since the Budget, should be restricted to 17 per cent for the 
year.138  That would mean even tighter monetary policy.  The Bank and Treasury were 
having problems enough keeping Heath to a mis-specified 20 per cent target.  By that 
stage, the Treasury had so little confidence in the Bank’s equations that the forecasters 
reverted to interest rate rather than money supply assumptions for the summer 
forecasting round.139 
At the August money supply meeting, Fforde described annualised M3 growth 
of 25 per cent as ‘alarming’.140  But, with higher interest rates ruled out, the Treasury 
seized upon his suggestion of a call for special deposits, the second leg of CCC.  The 
Treasury had initially hoped that, faced with a call for special deposits, the banks 
would trim their loan books.  In practice, they simply sold down second-line reserves, 
such as gilts, to meet the cash call.  In August 1972, the gilt market was still in fragile 
condition after the June currency crisis.  A call for special deposits might simply 
generate further selling, forcing market rates further above Bank Rate.  This would 
exacerbate another problem.  Bank Rate was the ‘penalty rate’ at which the Bank 
injected liquidity into the market via the Discount Houses.  But if the penalty rate was 
below wholesale rates, the market could borrow from the Bank and immediately 
invest in, for instance, certificates of deposit, to earn an arbitrage profit.  Until the 
Bank could develop a workable alternative to Bank Rate, further calls for special 
deposits were ruled out. 
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Bank Rate was finally replaced with the more flexible Minimum Lending Rate 
(MLR) in October 1972.  MLR tied the Bank’s discount rate to Treasury Bill rates 
prevailing in the market, by taking the rate at the previous weekly tender, adding 50 
basis points and rounding up to the nearest 25 basis points.  It was hoped that changes 
in MLR would have a smaller ‘announcement effect’ than changes in Bank Rate, 
allowing for greater flexibility.  As the Chief Cashier explained, ‘we adopted the 
Minimum Lending Rate technique basically because it was better than having Bank 
Rate completely frozen by Ministers, not because we thought it was technically a 
superior arrangement’.141 
Finally, more than a year after CCC was launched, it appeared that the Bank 
had achieved the interest rate flexibility that the policy required.  On 11 October 
1972, the Chancellor was advised that ‘the Bank’s current view is that if the 
provisional estimate of a 2¼% increase in money supply in banking September is 
confirmed, a call of 1% should be recommended’.142  Once again, politics intervened.  
Talks with the TUC and CBI were continuing, and while officials were attempting to 
deal with inflation by tightening monetary policy with calls for special deposits, the 
government was edging toward a statutory prices and incomes policy.  The situation 
was summarised by the Treasury’s Gordon Downey: ‘a favourable outcome from the 
Chequers talks could lead to big sales of gilts: on the other hand, if it implies a much 
lower rate of inflation, our target for money supply will need to be well below 
20%’.143 
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Downey’s own calculations pointed to an M3 target for 1973/74 of 12.5 per 
cent.144  Given that ‘the equations themselves have been unable to cope with the 
recent structural changes in the money supply’, Treasury officials were still against 
publishing a target.145  However, their ministers were becoming increasingly 
enthusiastic.  On 6 November, Heath announced a new prices and incomes policy, 
commencing with a 90-day freeze.  The next day, Financial Secretary Terence 
Higgins wrote to the Chancellor: 
 
we should try and restrict the growth in the money supply during the 90 day 
period to the 5% growth target.  I am more doubtful if we should announce 
this.  We have not previously given quantitative targets which can be seen to 
be missed and it might be interpreted (quite wrongly) as conversion to the 
Powell heresy.  There may however be advantages in giving a qualitative 
indication of our intentions.
146
 
 
To accommodate the ongoing 5 per cent GDP growth target, the Bank now 
estimated that M3 would need to increase by 13 per cent in the year ahead, a long way 
from the 20 per cent estimated in March.147  Cassell suggested ‘the target might better 
be set as a range with 13% towards the upper end’, while at the monthly money 
supply meeting, Bank and Treasury officials discussed a target range of 10-15 per 
cent.148  The Minister of State, John Nott, was only persuaded against publishing this 
target range because it would look high compared to the Europeans, who had agreed 
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to limit monetary growth to 6 per cent, albeit on a narrower measure than M3.149  
There was also pressure from the small group of Conservative backbenchers who had 
been bitten by the monetarist bug.  Sir Douglas Allen pointed to: 
 
a change in the political stance on monetary policy, which was associated with 
growing criticism from back bench Conservative MPs.  One result of this 
might be more discussion of the possibility of reverting to a quantitative 
policy.  The attitude of the EEC to monetary policy was also likely to be an 
increasing influence on Ministers.
150
 
 
The December 1972 forecast suggested that M3 would increase by 18 per cent 
in 1973/74, versus the unpublished target of ‘not more than 15%’.151  Barber played to 
Heath’s pro-European instincts to press for an ‘over-call’ of special deposits: 
 
in the absence of further restraining action money supply is likely to grow at a 
rate which would carry considerable dangers for the economy and for sterling – 
and which would expose us to increasing criticism from our European partners, 
many of whom have already taken resolute action to slow down the growth of 
money supply.
152 
 
Heath agreed to the largest (2 per cent) special deposit call to date.  It quickly became 
apparent that the authorities had overdone this call, as bank reserves again fell below 
the statutory minimum in early 1973.  A swift re-release of special deposits would be 
politically embarrassing.  The Government Broker explained: ‘the obvious remedy is 
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to pay back sufficient of the Special Deposits to set the position right and apologise 
for having made a mistake.  However, the powers that be, particularly the political 
ones, will not hear of it and once again [Fforde] says they are being run by politics 
against their better judgement’.153  Just as the interest rate weapon was blunted by 
political concerns during 1972, so the authorities were constrained in their ability to 
manipulate bank reserves through more flexible use of special deposits in 1973. 
Nor was there much help from the third main monetary policy instrument – 
sales of gilt-edged to the non-bank private sector – where the Bank consistently 
missed its forecasts.  Even allowing for Heath’s unwillingness to let the Bank use the 
interest rate weapon to ‘signal’ to gilt investors when they should start buying again, 
it was clear that some officials had never bought into the ‘Duke of York’ strategy.  In 
February 1973, the Chief Cashier, John Page, doubted whether ‘there is a rate of 
interest determinable by the authorities in abstraction from the behaviour of the 
market at which investors will buy gilt-edged in large quantities’.154  Page felt that 
substantial sales would come only after a successful conclusion to the tripartite talks 
on prices and incomes with the TUC and CBI.  And any attempt to force gilts onto a 
reluctant market would mean higher yields, which the Prime Minister continued to 
rule out. 
 The issue came into sharper focus as the 1973 Budget approached.  Barber 
restated his 5 per cent real GDP growth target.  This would mean an even higher 
deficit in the year ahead.  As Downey explained to the Chancellor, ‘with a public 
sector borrowing requirement of, say, £4,350 million in 1973-74, and a target growth 
of money supply (M3) of not more than 15%, it seemed likely that sales of public 
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sector debt to the non-banks would need to be of the order of £3,000 million.  This is 
a formidable objective’.155 
By this stage, junior Treasury ministers were pressing for the M3 target to be 
published.  Financial Secretary Terence Higgins wrote: ‘We are obviously going to 
have a frightful presentational problem when the size of the borrowing requirement 
becomes apparent.  I have never been in favour of public as against internal targets 
but it is arguable that one is necessary in this case’.156  Treasury officials were more 
cautious.  Downey noted that: 
 
We are under increasing pressure to follow our European partners in setting 
targets for money supply, and it is doubtful whether we can for long avoid 
disclosing a target figure to the EEC (which might quickly become public 
knowledge).  For our own purposes we might take as a target for 1973-74 a 
growth of money supply (M3) of not more than 15%.
157 
 
This worried the Bank.  In February 1973, Fforde warned that ‘Ministers and officials 
of HM Treasury might feel compelled to announce a money supply target for the 
forthcoming financial year.  But from the experience of last year any such 
commitment would be fraught with danger’.158 
When dealing with the Treasury, Fforde was now careful to refer to M3 as an 
indicator rather than a target.  Within the Bank, he was more emotive: ‘if you are not 
sure where you ought to be going, and are guided by an unreliable map, you are 
inclined to feel lost’.159  As he explained:  
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M3 has been officially acknowledged as important and has grown far more 
rapidly than might normally be thought desirable.  So it has attracted great 
attention and is thought, not without some reason, to have provoked the 
authorities into a high-key policy that encouraged the recent rise in nominal 
interest rates to yet higher historical highs.
160
 
 
The first public admission that all was not well came in an often-misinterpreted 
speech by the Deputy Governor, Jasper Hollom, in April 1973.  In private, Fforde was 
lamenting that ‘the defects of M3 as a simple aim have become manifest’.161  In 
public, Hollom was more circumspect: ‘relationships that appeared to be established 
in the past have not held good more recently’.162  Sir Douglas Wass naturally cites this 
speech as ‘a statement of the Bank’s attitude to the money supply at the time’.163  
However, to suggest that the speech was representative of a continuing Radcliffian 
scepticism towards the monetary aggregates, as Capie does, is to miss the significance 
of the first eighteen months of CCC.164  As Wass points out, ‘CCC had by then been 
killed by the hostility ministers showed to any suggestion that short-term interest rates 
should be increased to meet the monetary targets they had earlier been persuaded to 
accept’.165 
Hollom’s speech coincided with the completion of a Bank review of CCC, 
ordered by Heath after the 1973 Budget.  The Bank highlighted a number of technical 
problems.  The money supply, released from quantitative controls under CCC, had 
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immediately departed from the estimates.  This was partly because of 
‘reintermediation’.  Lending that had been pushed out to the ‘fringe’ banks by 
quantitative controls on the clearing banks before September 1971 returned to be 
counted in the statistics.  In principle, the Bank welcomed this.  Helping the clearers 
to win back market share at the expense of the fringe was one of the drivers of CCC. 
However, it was impossible to calculate precisely how much M3 growth was simply 
reintermediation.  This created a statistical fog, which made it difficult to operate 
monetary policy predicated on precise targets.  There was also the problem of the 
‘merry-go-round’.  As long as wholesale interest rates remained above Bank Rate, it 
was possible to arbitrage the system by drawing down overdrafts at pre-agreed 
(lower) rates, and placing the money in the wholesale market at current (higher) rates.  
Finally, there was the ‘CD tax loophole’. Tax was only paid on the proceeds from 
certificates of deposit if they were held to maturity.  But after the 1972 Budget, the 
interest cost of financing the certificates was tax-deductible.  Therefore, a top-rate UK 
taxpayer paying a marginal rate of 90 per cent could borrow £100,000 at 12 per cent, 
invest in a certificate of deposit yielding 2 per cent less, and sell it one day before 
maturity to net an almost risk-free £8,776.  Given the rudimentary state of banking 
statistics, it was difficult for the authorities to calculate how much M3 growth was 
due to ‘reintermediation’, how much was generated by the ‘merry-go-round’ and how 
much was created by tax loopholes. 
But the main problem was the Prime Minister.  Having been mis-sold CCC on 
its supposed competitive merits, Heath had failed to grasp the implications for interest 
rates.   In July 1972, he ‘repeated his inability to understand the new system’ saying 
 44 
that he ‘distrusted the argument that higher interest rates would help us’.166  Heath was 
still complaining in May 1973: ‘I am repeatedly hearing that interest rates at present 
levels are inhibiting the growth of investment, and that we are paying more for 
Government borrowing than we need.  And the recent action of the authorities in 
actually pushing short-term rates up seems incomprehensible to a great many 
people’.167  He may, unwittingly, have hit upon an important point.  The 
unprecedented nominal interest rates of 1979-80 under his Conservative successor 
would do little to rein in £M3 growth, and likely accelerated it by increasing 
distressed borrowing. 
Officials toned down their political criticism when submitting the CCC review 
to ministers in May 1973.  Nonetheless, Sir Douglas Allen pointed out that ‘interest 
rates must remain a cardinal feature of any system as long as control over the growth 
of the money supply remains an important objective of policy – and the arguments 
against abandoning such an objective are, in our view, conclusive’.168  Despite this 
advice, ministers remained reluctant to raise rates partly because of the impact that 
might have on the voting intentions of mortgage payers - ‘the most carefully 
cultivated political lobby in the UK’.169  Higher MLR might take mortgage rates 
above the politically sensitive ten-per cent level.  Also, mortgage costs were included 
in the Retail Prices Index, so higher rates would translate directly into higher headline 
inflation.  With another round of prices and incomes to negotiate, this would be 
politically undesirable. 
In July 1973, these domestic considerations were overtaken by the final collapse 
of Bretton Woods.  As other countries raised interest rates to defend their now-
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floating currencies, lower British rates made the pound a less attractive proposition.  
As Cassell pointed out: 
 
Surely the time has come when somebody must ask what constitutes the 
bigger threat to the counter-inflation policy: a further rise of ½% in the 
mortgage rate (which would still leave it barely a positive rate of interest), or a 
further fall in the exchange rate because of the adverse interest rate 
differentials with international money markets.
170
 
 
Heath was more receptive to arguments involving sterling, and since unchanged 
interest rates now meant a lower pound and higher inflation, he agreed to raise MLR.  
Technically, MLR was now market-driven, so the mechanism was to call additional 
special deposits and let the market take rates higher as the banks sold assets to raise 
the cash. 
 On 19 July 1973, the Bank called another 1 per cent of special deposits.  This 
pushed MLR up to 9 per cent.  It did little to help sterling, which fell to a new low 
against the trade-weighted index.  The problem was exacerbated by the weak US 
dollar and the strong Deutschmark, as the Bundesbank’s brief experiment with 
monetary base control saw overnight rates in Germany approach 40 per cent.  On 27 
July, the Bank allowed the market to take MLR to 11.5 per cent.  This was about as 
far as ministers were prepared to go.  Control of the money supply would require 
alternative solutions: ‘The Chancellor asked that some contingency work should be 
done on a package to be available if it became clear that the methods of controlling 
the money supply envisaged in "competition and credit control" were no longer 
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effective without raising interest rates to a quite unacceptable level’.171  When the July 
money supply figures showed M3 growing at an annualised 23 per cent, versus the 15 
per cent envisaged at the time of the Budget, officials had to look beyond MLR.   
In November, Barber wrote to the Governor: 
 
I frankly do not believe that we can continue as at present to rely so 
exclusively on interest rate changes at a time when the level of bank advances 
seems to be very insensitive to interest rates.  I therefore think it is a matter of 
urgency that we should bring to the Prime Minister’s attention possible 
approaches to this problem which would rely less exclusively on increases of 
interest rates to control the level of money supply.
172
 
 
The prospect of renewed ceilings caused consternation within the Bank.  In an echo of 
his ‘curious and rather emotional’ note of Christmas Eve 1970, Fforde advised the 
Governor that ‘the reimposition of ceiling controls would be a strategic error of 
monetary and economic management’.173  It would damage the financial system, close 
off channels of finance to industry, mark a retreat from ‘the spirit of competitiveness’, 
and represent a blow to the standing and reputation of the Bank.  In any event, as 
Goodhart pointed out, ‘in the past it has not been possible to discern any effect 
whatsoever of bank lending ceilings, even the tight ones in 1967-70, on the growth of 
the money supply’.174  Nonetheless, the Bank had to come up with another way to 
control M3. 
The solution, supplementary special deposits (the ‘corset’), involved a shift 
from trying to control bank assets (loans) to controlling their interest-bearing eligible 
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liabilities (‘IBELs’).  The idea was to put a brake on the growth of bank deposits, by 
restraining the banks from bidding aggressively for funds, raising interest rates, and 
swelling M3.  The Bank explained: ‘the main reason for the choice is that banks’ 
liabilities have the closer relationship with M3’.175  Indeed, ‘the prime objective of 
this device is, quite simply, to contain the growth of M3.  A second objective is to 
avoid producing any perceptible further upthrust in the general level of interest 
rates’.176 
Under the new scheme, the banks were required to deposit non interest-bearing 
cash at the Bank as their interest-bearing deposits grew above pre-agreed limits. 
Officials were aware that this would simply divert lending back to less-regulated 
markets, artificially reducing the monetary statistics.  As the Bank pointed out, ‘the 
basic approach is deliberately to bring about a measure of disintermediation of the 
banks ... Such a development would plainly run completely counter to the objective, 
embodied in Competition and Credit Control, of increasing efficiency in the provision 
of finance’.177  December 1973 also marked the retirement of the interest rate weapon.  
As the MPG noted, the corset ‘freed interest rates from responsibility for controlling 
the growth of money supply’.178  Britain’s first money supply experiment was over. 
There remained the thorny question of where to set the quantitative target. 
Given that the primary purpose of the corset was to control M3, the Bank initially 
suggested ‘the rate of growth desired in M3 might simply be adopted as the rate of 
growth in the target for interest-bearing liabilities’.179  As such, the clearing banks 
were asked to consider a flat 20 per cent supplementary special deposit on any growth 
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in IBELs above 12 per cent.180  The banks argued that a minimum 17 per cent 
threshold was required to ensure that there was no dislocation to the economy.181  
Both sides settled for a six-month formula, based on the following sliding scale: 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Barber unveiled the corset during his December 1973 mini-Budget.  At that 
stage the British economy was in a mess.  Having grown at an unsustainable 7.4 per 
cent in 1973, the economy was about to enter its deepest recession since the 1930s.  
Inflation was back above 10 per cent, and with wages indexed to inflation under Stage 
Three of Heath’s incomes policy, it would get worse before it got better.  The current 
account was in substantial deficit even before the impact of higher oil prices.  And 
with the miners on an overtime ban, Heath announced that Britain would begin 1974 
with another three-day week. 
Usually, economic difficulties on this scale meant a call to the IMF.  This time 
even the Fund could not help.  In January 1974, with the current account deficit for 
1974/75 estimated at £2.4 billion (3 per cent of GDP), Barber broached the subject of 
a loan with the Fund.182  The IMF was keen to carve out a new role for itself in a 
world of floating currencies, and was formulating plans to recycle the oil producers’ 
newfound surpluses.  But the Fund’s European Director admitted to being ‘very 
perplexed’ as to how, under present circumstances, the British government might 
bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion.183  The government had already 
drawn most of its low conditionality IMF tranche when sterling was ejected from the 
European currency snake in 1972.  A further loan would have to be drawn from the 
higher conditionality ‘credit tranches’. This would mean strict quantitative targets. 
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Failure to secure an IMF loan would be worse for confidence than not applying in the 
first place.  The application was dropped.184  A week later, Heath called a General 
Election. 
 
V 
 
CCC was predicated on the Bank’s ability to forecast the demand-for-money with 
some precision, its capacity to control monetary growth with the interest rate weapon, 
and on the continuation of a stable and predictable relationship between M3 and 
nominal incomes.  None of these conditions survived the monetary upheavals of 
1972-73.  But there was a deeper flaw.  Because CCC was an omnibus solution to 
several different problems, different members of the ‘macroeconomic executive’ had 
different conceptions of what it was for, and how it worked.  For John Fforde, it was 
primarily a means of getting rid of ceiling controls.  For some younger Bank officials, 
it was an extension of their work within the Money Supply Group.  For the Treasury, 
initially at least, it was about more frequent use of special deposits to manage 
aggregate demand.  For the Conservative government it was about injecting more 
competition into the banking system.  Because of Heath’s hostility towards anything 
that hinted at monetarism, the Bank had to sell the proposal on its ‘competitive’ 
merits.  The fact that different strands of the policy appealed to different members of 
the macroeconomic executive was essential to its adoption in 1971.  But it meant that 
when the policy came to be tested, it was found wanting. 
Different institutions drew different conclusions from the failure of CCC.  The 
Bank decided that M3 was a ‘decidedly defective’ measure and began a long 
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campaign to shift the emphasis to the narrower monetary aggregate, M1.185  The 
Treasury had always been sceptical of the Bank’s ability to forecast and control the 
money supply.  Nonetheless, both institutions successfully pressed a published M3 
target onto the Labour Chancellor, Denis Healey, in July 1976.  This was in a very 
different context to the unpublished objective pressed upon his Conservative 
predecessor four years earlier.  By 1976, the PSBR had overtaken bank lending as the 
largest counterpart of M3, and the Bank saw a published target as ‘a tighter rope 
round the Chancellor’s neck’ on the spending ambitions of the Labour government – 
fiscal policy via the monetary policy back door.186 A reluctant Permanent Secretary 
acquiesced primarily because of the confidence effects the target might have on 
troubled financial markets.187 
Conservative policymakers drew different conclusions from the experience of 
1971-73.  After Mrs Thatcher’s leadership victory in 1975, Conservative economic 
planning was increasingly dominated by a coterie of ‘believing monetarists’, 
apparently unaware of the importance attached to the money supply under CCC, and 
convinced that ‘monetary policy neglect’ was the primary cause of the subsequent 
inflation.188  The result was an ‘accidental’ recession in the early 1980s that required 
the monetary policy u-turn of the 1981 Budget when the Chancellor, Sir Geoffrey 
Howe, lowered interest rates, despite the money supply overshooting his published 
target, while raising taxes.189 
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Reflecting on the early-1980’s money supply experiment, Nigel Lawson, 
quotes Robert Burns: ‘The best-laid schemes o' mice an' men/Gang aft agley’.190  If 
the Prime Minister had allowed him to explain in September 1980, John Fforde, the 
architect of the previous money supply experiment, would no doubt have agreed. 
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